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Abstract 
This paper analyzes risk and returns associated with pre-harvest corn grain marketing 
strategies for the state of Arkansas. Farming is characterized by a volatile environment. 
Numerous risks are taken by producers in order to provide commodities that are bought and sold 
by various parties in the supply chain. Price, yield, and production costs vary daily and can have 
large variation between years. Risk and Return Comparisons of Pre-harvest Marketing 
Strategies examines the effectiveness of using pre-harvest marketing strategies to enhance 
returns and to mitigate inherent price risk in the Memphis cash corn market. Thirteen strategies 
are compared to the October 1 Memphis, spot price and are examined through multiple 
parametric and nonparametric statistical tests. To supplement the statistical findings, coefficients 
of variation for each strategy’s annual average price received, profit per bushel, and profit per 
acre are compared. The nonparametric results reveal that there are significant differences in some 
pre-harvest marketing strategies for the state of Arkansas from marketing grain on the cash 
market at Memphis. The coefficient of variation comparison backs up these findings by revealing 
that strategies have historically had different risk and return profiles from the 2001-2017 period. 
World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimate reports released by the USDA were used to 
forecast harvest-time Memphis cash price, and strategies based on these report-based forecasts 
were implemented to test if marketing after the release dates allows for returns greater than at the 
harvest cash price and with less variation. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
Pre-harvest marketing strategies are important for farmers who need to manage price risk 
and sell grain at profitable levels.  Strategy performance has been the focus of much research, 
and various farmer pre-harvest marketing strategies have been compared with the benchmark of 
futures market efficiency and how it pertains to the possibility of profit realization. While 
simulation models of commodity prices and yields have been used for past strategy comparisons 
(Houpert, 2013; Rodriguez, 2003), my research takes another direction and tackles the problem 
of analyzing various pre-harvest marketing strategies using historically observed prices. 
Specifically, I analyze various pre-harvest marketing strategies for a hypothetical farmer selling 
corn in Memphis, Tennessee. We present and compare the historical performance of specific 
marketing strategies to the benchmark strategy of selling at the October cash harvest price. This 
research uses time series data that will give insight into average historical performance of various 
marketing strategies. The specifics of practically implementing each strategy will be covered in 
detail, along with the statistical methods used to reach conclusions about their risk-return 
performance. This research has important implications for Arkansas corn farmers.  The effects of 
grain marketing are far reaching, from the producer to the broker and beyond. The livestock and 
meat packing industry depend on corn for grain, Tyson being a primary example. Other large 
industries such as distilleries and ethanol plants use corn as well and need to hedge their 
exposure from market fluctuations to manage risk. Producers and marketers of grain hedge 
against downward movement in prices, and firms that use grain as an input need to hedge against 
upward moving prices. This paper will focus on marketing from the perspective of the former, 
the farmer or merchant who needs to capture prices high enough to at least break even. Price 
variation is a widely studied occurrence that has significant profit consequences; thus, the 
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effectiveness of pre-planned strategy selection for hedging against exposure is closely studied in 
the next chapters. 
This thesis proceeds to examine revenue and profit characteristics of corn grain, 
comparable risk levels for each strategy, and a comparison of returns over three measurement 
criteria. The overarching objective in this paper is to answer the question, do strategic marketing 
plans yield risk-return profiles significantly different than a simple baseline cash harvest price 
sale strategy? We assume, a priori, that there is no significant difference – based on prior 
research and market efficiency – and test this hypothesis rigorously through multiple statistical 
tests. Additionally, we rank 13 individual pre-harvest marketing strategies based on average 
revenue in terms of price received along with profit levels, standard deviation of revenue and 
profit levels, and revenue and profit level coefficients of variation, allowing for a simple and 
straight forward, no frills apples-to-apples comparison. Our results will shed additional light on 
the marketing literature.  
The research goals of this paper are focused on providing clear information and 
replicable results to marketers and commodity producers. If any of this work contributes to 
increased knowledge and awareness about marketing economics, it will achieve the goal in mind 
from the onset of research: to provide information for the grain marketing industry and 
contribute to academic literature that will help improve results in agricultural business strategy. 
We test prevailing assumptions held by different researchers that dispute effectiveness of pre-
harvest hedging and marketing strategies in general. The issues addressed are conflicting to say 
the least, as this characteristic of the literature is apparent. Although the methods used are not a 
giant breakthrough in the field of mathematics, a specific effort has been made that includes 
models with a replicable framework. Replication will allow the ideas presented in this research 
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to be used in other scenarios, and with other commodities.  Risk and Return Comparisons of Pre-
harvest Corn Marketing Strategies focuses on providing strategy options for a wide range of risk 
preferences. The following chapters include an introduction to the main and specific objectives 
of the research problem, a literature review for background concepts relevant to the grain market 
and grain market participants’ behavior, research on price behavior characteristics in the market, 
data sources and considerations, the methodology implemented, the results of our hypotheses 
tests and minimum coefficients of variation framework, then finally the summary and conclusion 
section of the findings with implications and future research. 
Overall and Specific Objectives 
I. Test if it is possible to get better performance in returns using pre-harvest marketing
techniques. Answer the question, do strategic corn marketing plans yield results
different than at the baseline spot market harvest price on average?
a. Test the null assumption of there being no statistical difference in pre-harvest
strategies and harvest time sample prices using parametric and nonparametric
tests. Test for statistical differences in mean strategy returns for prices received,
profit per bushel, and profit per acre. Thirteen strategies tested are compared to
the October 1 spot bid from Memphis including three futures strategies, three
forward strategies, five variations of average price contracts, World Agriculture
Supply and Demand Estimate (WASDE) Report Stocks to Use strategy, and
finally WASDE Report average national price estimate strategy for pricing
bushels after its May release.
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II. From a risk management perspective, we rank thirteen strategies based on a minimum
coefficient of variation framework that is implemented across three comparisons:
prices received, profit per bushel, and profit per acre.
a. Discover if there is a significant benefit to trading after the release of May
WASDE reports.
b. Discover if new generation averaging contracts perform as well as selling in the
harvest-time cash market.
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Chapter II Literature Review 
Decisions by agents1 in the commodity sector are dependent on information. The quality 
and completeness of information used is a major factor in the effectiveness of using the futures 
market and the determination of prices associated with market agent expectations. Results from a 
large body of research in this area show that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
crop reports2 are valuable and newsworthy.  The USDA publishes reports (e.g. WASDE and 
crop production reports) that alter expectations, in turn creating responses in the futures market.  
This revelation is potentially useful to an agent trading in the futures market if they can exploit 
large price movements in the wake of the report release and adjust their trading, marketing, and 
hedging decisions accordingly. The extent to which this is possible would be contingent upon 
how efficiently and quickly the futures market impounds the new information contained in a 
report. If futures markets are efficient, then it would not be possible to systematically take 
advantage of price movements following report release. However, if futures market agents do not 
behave rationally and futures markets overreact to “bullish” report information – resulting in 
large price increases – then marketing strategies that incorporate such price trends could yield 
additional profits over and above a benchmark strategy of simply selling in the harvest-time cash 
market.  
Pre-harvest price expectations drives the harvest-time new crop corn futures market 
(McKenzie, 2008), which highlights the need for complete availability and access to information 
for the market to remain efficient.  If pre-harvest price expectations are influenced by irrational 
agents, then pre-harvest marketing strategies that incorporate irrational futures price movements 
1 Agents are all U.S. corn market participants, which include hedgers, traders, farmers, and analysts. 
2August Crop reports by the USDA were deemed newsworthy by McKenzie’s (2008) research due to futures price reactions after 
release dates. 
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could be profitable. However, McKenzie concludes that pre-harvest price expectations are 
generated by rational agent behavior and that a semi-strong form version of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis holds for the corn futures market so that USDA report information is incorporated in 
a timely manner. Therefore, this research would infer that pre-harvest marketing strategies 
seeking to exploit irrationally large price increases following USDA report information would 
not be profitable.  
In contrast, Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin (1998), and O’Brien (2000) have found that pre-
harvest marketing strategies tend to lead to increases in average returns. Wisner, Blue, and 
Baldwin attribute this to market uncertainty during the early pre-harvest period. The uncertainty 
stems from potential supply and demand shocks such as drought or flood, and the overall 
political and economic environment which can create risk premiums in the form of abnormally 
high futures prices early in the year. However, Zulauf and Irwin (1998), contradict Wisner Blue 
and Baldwin’s findings of a pre-harvest price premium and conclude that there is no significant 
difference in the profitability of pre-harvest strategies and a harvest time cash sale strategy.   
This thesis sheds further light on the pre-harvest marketing debate by statistically testing 
the ability of pre-harvest strategies to increase farmers’ average returns. We test the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistical difference in the mean returns generated by pre-harvest 
marketing strategies and the benchmark strategy of selling in the harvest-time cash market.  
Issues with Market Agents Irrationality and Pricing Implications 
Agents in the reasonably large commodity trading sector are not always rational, as 
shown by Richard Thaler’s Nobel Prize behavioral economics research (Mental Accounting and 
Consumer Choice. Richard H. Thaler’s Nobel Prize winning work) addresses the burgeoning 
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issue of using the neoclassical model of rational behavior.  Rational agents are characterized as 
those whom incorporate available information, examine costs and benefits of preferences, study 
event probability, and make consistent choices. In futures markets, McKenzie (2008) 
characterized the agents whom Thaler found that market participants do not typically behave 
rationally, as solution optimizers, on average and are more often subject to biases of different 
origins. Market participants were found to overreact to information available through news 
reports, media, and commodity dashboards. Proving that agents who participate in market 
activity, whether that is farmers or traders, exhibit significant ignorance and bias when presented 
with market news and information. To assume that participants are rational would be likened to 
assuming that the agents always incorporate all available information to come to a decision on 
marketing choices, which would exhibit strong form efficiency by market participants.   
  The status quo, which would be the neoclassical paradigm, is scrutinized in Thaler’s 
work due to the fallacy that consumers behave in rational ways when making economic 
decisions.  Thus, we call consumers that fall into this method of neoclassical decision making 
Econs3.  Econs are predictable and facilitate model creation through assumptions of rationality 
and simplicity. This ignores human variability, allowing the agents in question to be standardized 
for comparison.  Using the neoclassical paradigm model that assumes rational behavior by the 
actors, researchers do not have to account for irrational behavioral variables.  
The Homo Economicus4 model is considered sub-par in Thaler’s research because there 
is the assumption of optimal solution seeking behavior on behalf of the consumer, which in turn 
is rarely the case.  Empirical evidence shows that consumers behave highly irrationally, and this 
3 Econs is the term used by Richard Thaler to denote an agent of the neoclassical paradigm model that assumes 
rational behavior.  
4 Homo Economicus refers to what is otherwise termed by Thaler as Econs under rational behavior hypotheses. 
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fact is at odds with the neoclassical model that assumes agents behave rationally.  A problem 
was apparent to Thaler (2016) when he “realized relying on one theory to accomplish two rather 
different goals, namely, to characterize optimal behavior and to predict actual behavior.”  We 
can deduct from Thaler’s statement that actual and optimal behavior are far from the same.  This 
is later studied in examples of financial markets as well as in Bridging the Divide between Social 
and Behavioral Science and Policy by Craig R. Fox and Sim B. Sitkin, 2015.       
Fox and Sitkin (2015) note in their essay that humans make irrational and sub-optimal 
decisions quite often, which can be attributed to present bias in the mind of Homo Sapiens. 
Disproportionate probability weighting of outcomes, and how psychology plays a role in 
determining an individuals’ loss aversion level, factor into predicting real human behavior. This 
is evident in a case study of patients choosing medical plans. On average, people selected plans 
that significantly fell short of optimizing their welfare. The authors say that, “Individuals have a 
severely limited capacity to attend to, recall, and process information, and therefore to choose 
optimally.” Further studies show that people tend to prefer the status quo and default options if 
they are provided and available, when given the choice.  
Another interesting finding in both Thaler's work and the essay by Fox and Sitkin 
examines the tendency to be myopic in decision making. Subjects will prefer gratification and 
fulfillment sooner rather than later, now in the present instead of in the future. Immediate 
consumption drives many consumers’ processes.  
Both papers make it clear that empirical evidence is key to the field of behavioral 
economics. It is noted that theory has its place, but concrete evidence is the best way to move 
ahead in this expanding field of study. Thaler says, “If we limit ourselves to variables that have 
empirical basis, all of economics will become more disciplined.” Supposedly irrelevant factors to 
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the neoclassical model of rational behavior are many times a crucial part of consumer behavior 
and the study thereof. It is important to constantly evolve models and develop tests to account for 
these factors when possible. In the context of our research question – can pre-harvest marketing 
strategies outperform a harvest-time cash sale benchmark strategy – if irrational agents influence 
pre-harvest futures prices, then pre-harvest marketing strategies that either use futures markets 
directly or indirectly (in the form of forward contracts) may be profitable. The potential for 
irrational futures behavior makes this ultimately an empirical question and one that we seek to 
address in this thesis. 
Risk Management in Agricultural Markets 
Tomek and Peterson (2001) study what academic research can and cannot contribute to 
producers in the form of risk management.  The research covers price and revenue risk that a 
United States grain market participant faces, and how market information from various sources 
impacts his or her objectives. The authors study the current knowledge on marketing strategies 
implemented to price commodities along with often overlooked yield distributions, which 
equally play a crucial role in the outcome and livelihood of farmers.  
Farmers are assumed to be profit maximizers, and depending on their degree of risk 
aversion, different marketing strategies are available to hedge risk and capture high enough 
prices to cover production costs. Tomek and Peterson conclude that farm specific total costs, 
yield variability, and risk for each marketing alternative should be addressed to properly study 
the possibilities available for constructing marketing strategies.  They point out that most farmer 
price risk management and marketing studies fail to account for costs of production. Given this 
omission, they conclude that empirical results across this body of research are difficult to 
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categorize and appraise. This thesis research attempts to address this issue by including measures 
of farm production costs using crop enterprise budgets. The research presented in subsequent 
sections incorporates total production costs to obtain cost of production coverage levels, which 
are used as pricing thresholds to implement pre-harvest marketing strategies. Effective prices and 
profits, for each strategy, on a price per bushel and a per acre basis, are then evaluated against 
the benchmark harvest-time cash sale strategy.  
Price, Yield and Cost Risk 
The management of price risk is a primary reason for analyzing returns of different 
hedging strategies. In this context, strategy performance is evaluated in terms of which strategy 
results in the lowest price risk over time. However, models that characterize risk using only price 
movement should also be aware that there are other crucial factors at play. Yield and cost risks 
can be just as detrimental to profitability and earnings and should be incorporated into models 
along with price. Yield varies according to soil quality, management practices, seed variety, and 
the planted area’s climate just to name a few influences in play. Stress on crops due to weather 
have large influences on yields and can be the difference in making profits or losses in good and 
bad crop years. The interaction or correlation between marketing strategy prices and farm yields 
plays a crucial role in determining farmer returns and return-risk. In addition to price and yield 
risk farmers also face production cost risk in the form of volatile input prices. Ultimately the 
failure to weight yield and cost risks alongside price risk can cause producers to perform far 
worse than expected when marketing their crops. This thesis research explicitly accounts for 
price, yield and production cost risk when evaluating the return and return-risk performance of 
pre-harvest marketing strategies. 
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Can Pre-harvest Marketing Strategies be Used to Increase Income? 
Extension economists rated the research issue of determining if marketing strategies can 
be used to increase incomes as being of prime importance (Brorsen and Anderson, 1997). Zulauf 
and Irwin (1998) take the position that pre-harvest marketing strategies are not able to increase 
farmers’ income.  Zulauf and Irwin’s research has influenced extension economists to focus less 
on using futures markets to enhance profits and more on using them to manage risk by locking 
prices at favorable levels. However, many extension economists, together with producers, still 
believe that the pre-harvest period offers marketing strategy opportunities to capture higher 
prices than those typically available at harvest time. This line of thought is consistent with 
Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin (1998).  
Brorsen (1998) argues that Zulauf and Irwin’s findings are consistent with a form of 
rational expectations theory5. Brorsen, like Tomek and Peterson (2001), suggests that agents 
with superior analytical ability and better access to information can realize higher returns than 
those without. These findings explain the need for existing marketing experts and analysis 
among agricultural marketing consultants.  Marketing advisors have a place to help producers 
market their crops and mitigate risk. However, Irwin et al. (2000) found that rarely can 
marketing advisors consistently repeat profitable marketing performance from year to year. They 
argue that good risk management strategies exist, but they have associated costs, and that the 
benefits from undertaking a specific strategy should consistently outweigh the associated costs. 
5 Rational expectations theory was proposed by John F. Muth (1961) at the University of Indiana. He ascribed 
economic outcomes to expectations of ebbs and flows of market performance. It is a precursor to random walk 
theory and efficient markets hypothesis. Rational expectations theory assumes that participants aim to maximize 
their utility in all situations. 
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Chapter III Methodology 
Methodological Objectives 
I. Test for increased performance in terms of higher returns using pre-harvest marketing
techniques versus the harvest-time spot market. Answer the question: Do strategic
pre-harvest corn marketing plans yield results different than at the baseline spot
market harvest price on average?
a. Test the null assumption of there being no statistical difference in pre-harvest
strategies and harvest time cash prices. Test for statistical differences in mean
strategy returns for prices received, profit per bushel, and profit per acre.  Thirteen
strategies tested are: 100%, 125%, 150% coverage of cost of production (COP)
futures strategies, 100%, 125%, 150% coverage of COP, average price contract
priced each Wednesday after the WASDE release until October 1, May daily
average price contract, June daily average price contract, July daily average price
contract, and June/July daily average price contract, WASDE Report Stocks to
Use strategy,  and finally WASDE Report average national price estimate strategy
for pricing bushels after its May release.
II. From a risk management perspective, we rank thirteen strategies based on a minimum
coefficient of variation framework that is implemented across three comparisons:
prices received, profit per bushel, and profit per acre.
a. Discover if there is a significant benefit to trading after the release of May
WASDE reports.
b. Discover if new generation averaging contracts perform as well as a benchmark
harvest-time cash sale strategy
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Yearly averages of prices received, profit per bushel, and profit per acre are compared for 
the 2001-2017 sample period. The results of all statistical tests are covered in a later results 
section. 
In this next section all of the statistical tests used, and the hypotheses analyzed are 
defined:6 
Farmer profits per bushel or per acre for any marketing strategy (pre-harvest or 
benchmark harvest-time cash sale) are defined as: 
Profits = price a farmer receives for his grain (P) * quantity produced (Q)- total costs (TC). 
Where Q is measured in total bushels produced or a per acre basis and is determined by average 
yearly Arkansas yield per acre for corn; and TC comprises yearly costs associated with 
producing an acre of corn in Arkansas (taken from crop production budgets). Arkansas average 
data are used for profit calculations; therefore this research does not address farm level results 
but may depict the Arkansas corn grain marketing environment in aggregate.  
More specifically farmer returns are broken down into three categories: price received per 
bushel, profit per bushel, and profit per acre: 
Price Received cents per bushel 
Pricecents/bu 
Profit in cents per bushel 
 (Pricecents/bu - Costscents/bu) 
6 All statistical tests were run in StatTools7 software. 
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$ Profit per Acre 
(Revenuedollars/acre-Costsdollars/acre) = ((Pdollars/bu*Yieldbu/acre)-Costsdollars/acre) 
Mean differences 
We found the simple mean differences in strategy average prices and profits 








Where µxi-xs is a specific strategy i minus the benchmark harvest-time October 1 cash 
price s. 
         Xi=Strategy prices and profits selected for comparison 
Xs=October 1 cash prices and profits 
  n= number of yearly observations, which is seventeen 
Median differences 
We found the median differences in strategy averages compared to the benchmark 
harvest-time October 1 cash price. This formula indicates the position in the set of 
return data, and the median becomes that value at that position in the sample. 
MMi -Ms ={(n+1)/2}th Mi - {(n+1)/2}th Ms
Where  
Mi=median of strategy price or profit i selected for comparison 
n= the number of values in the series
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th= a number corresponding to the median value after listing the values in ascending 
order 
Ms= the median of the October1cash prices and profits 
Parametric Tests 
T-test
Two Tailed Hypothesis Test 
H0: µXi-Xs=0 
HA: µXi-Xs ≠ 0 
One Tailed Hypothesis test 
H0: µXi-Xs=0 









t is the sample statistic 
Xi=mean price/profit of selected strategy i in the comparison 
Xs=mean price/profit of the harvest-time October 1 spot price 
S2= sample variance 






Xi=mean price/profit of selected strategy i in comparison 
Xs=mean price/profit of the harvest-time October 1 spot price 
ni=number of observations of the selected strategy 




  α=.01=2.75 
Ho: The null hypothesis, the mean differences between pre-harvest marketing strategy 
prices and profits versus benchmark harvest-time cash strategy over the 2001-2017 
period is not statistically different than zero. 
Ha: The alternative hypothesis, the mean differences between pre-harvest marketing 
strategy prices and profits versus benchmark harvest-time cash strategy over the 
2001-2017 period are statistically greater than zero (one-tailed test) or statistically 
different from zero (two-tailed test). 
Degrees of freedom 
df=ni+ns-2=32 
ni= number of observations of the selected strategy 2001-2017 
ns=number of observations of the harvest-time October 1 spot price 2001-2017 
F-test of Equal Sample Variances
17 




𝜎𝜎i2= sample variance of the selected strategy prices and profits 
𝜎𝜎s2= sample variance of the spot market prices and profits on October 1 
F Critical Value=F1-α/2, ni-1,ns-1 
α=significance level 
 ni= -1 gives degrees of freedom dfni 








Si2=Variance of the selected strategy prices and profits for comparison 
Ss2=Variance of the October 1 harvest cash prices and profits  
Nonparametric Tests
Sign test: one and two sided 
The sign test looks for significant differences in the medians from 0 for selected x,y pairs, 
labeled Mi and Ms. 
Sign test one sided 
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The one-sided sign test looks for medians equal or greater than 0. 
MMi -Ms >0 
If not, MMi -Ms =0 
MXi=median of the selected strategy prices and profits 
MXs=median of the harvest-time cash prices and profits 
Sign test two sided7 
The two-sided sign test looks for medians greater, equal to, or less than the null of 0. 
MXi-MXs>0, MXi-MXs<0, MXi-MXs=0 
Sign test two sided8 
The two-sided sign test looks for medians greater, equal to, or less than the null of 0. 
MXi-MXs>0, MXi-MXs<0, MXi-MXs=0 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Paired Sample Analysis 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is a test of whether means differ from the hypothesized 
mean of 0. It differs from the Sign test by measuring the magnitude of differences between the two 
sample means. The test assumes a symmetric but not normal distribution. 
N is the sample size, which is the number of pairs. Therefore, there are a total of 2N data 
points. Pairs with measurement values that equals 0 are not considered. 
For pairs i=1,…N, abs | X2,i-X1,i| and the sign function: 
7 Two-tailed tests intuitively have twice the p-value because the distribution includes values less than the mean of 
observations. 
8 Two-tailed tests intuitively have twice the p-value because the distribution includes values less than the mean of 
observations. 
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Sgn(x)= {-1 if x<0; 0 if x=0; 1 if x>0} 
The remaining pairs are ordered from the smallest absolute differences to the largest. The 
smallest is labeled as 1. Equivalent values are ranked according to the average of ranks spanned. 
Each pair receives a sign, then sum the signed ranks. The W test statistic is used to sum signed 
ranks as follows: 
W=∑ {𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 X2,i-X1,i)*Ri} 
X2,i=difference measurement of median of the benchmark October 1 strategy prices or 
profits from hypothesized median of 0 
X1,i=difference measurement of the median of the selected strategy prices and profits 
from hypothesized median of 0 
Nr=Number of pairs included in the test, where absolute values of difference 
measurement equal to 0 are excluded. 
Ri=Rank assigned 
The critical value can be found with sample size N=17 and the level of significance in a 
W critical value table. 
 For a test stat W17, (.1,.05, or .01), the critical values equal 41, 35, and 23 for a two tailed test 
respectively.  
If test stat |W| > Wcritical, Nr9; reject H0.  
The |W| for each strategy is compared to the Wcritical, Nr to determine its significance. If the 
absolute value is greater than that of the critical value, reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
in the medians between strategies. 
9 The critical values for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test will differ by Nr, i.e., the number will not of always be 17. 
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Chi-Squared Normality Tests 
This nonparametric test reveals if the observed variable in the data for a specific variable 
has a normal distribution. Histograms with bins of range values are superimposed upon a 
normally distributed histogram to represent the distribution of values since the data is 
continuous.  
The chi-squared test for normality tests for normal distribution of the data10. The null is that data 
are assumed to be normally distributed. 
H0: Data fits a normal distribution 
Ha: Data is not normally distributed 




Oi= Observed value 






F=the cumulative distribution function 
i=bin class 
Ymax=upper limit for bin i 
10 For the Chi Squared test to be relevant, the expected frequency should be at least five. 
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Ymin=lower limit for bin i 
Degrees of Freedom 
k=number of bins 
c=number of parameters in a normal distribution +1, assuming 2 parameters. 
df=k-c 
df=6-3=3 degrees of freedom 
Critical Region 
X21-α,k-c 
The hypothesis of a normal distribution is rejected in the event of the test stat being 
greater than the critical region 
X2 >X21-α, k-c 
Critical region for the chi squared test for normal distribution at significance level α: 
X2 1- α .1,3=6.251 
X2 1- α.05,3=7.815 
X2 1- α.01,3=11.345 
The coefficient of variation is calculated as: 









n=number of observations 





Description of Various Contracts Used in the Marketing Strategies 
Forward Contracts 
Forward exchange contracts are used extensively for hedging risk in the form of price exposures. 
Advantages: 
• Locks in a negotiated price, quantity, and time frame for delivery.  This allows farmers to
hedge against downward movement.
• Flexibility regarding the amount to be covered. Forwards are priced in customizable
bushel amounts or increments11.
• relatively straightforward both to comprehend and to organize.
Disadvantages: 
• The contractual commitment must be completed on the due date.
• No opportunity to benefit from favorable movements in exchange rates. However, pricing
in increments allows for averaging of prices received.
• Risk of default and risk of over-booking projected production.
Harvest-time Cash Grain Contracts 
Farmers are accustomed to marketing crops on the cash or spot market at their local grain 
elevator or regional grain buyer. The cash bids presented in this thesis come from the Memphis, 
Tennessee, daily grain spot prices. This elevator serves the Arkansas delta region as the largest 
buyer of grain for the area. The price is set by the elevator at a basis level +/- futures price 
depending on stocks and usage. Cash grain is considered the default or status quo for producers. 
This research finds that cash grain prices are highly variable, possessing the highest level of 
volatility in the test results.  Elevators in different geographic locations offer cash bids at a 
11 In a discussion with multiple Mississippi River Delta farmers, it was found to be common practice to price bushel 
using forward contracting with a grain elevator. Bushels priced on a forward contract are dependent upon the size of 
an operation and are negotiable in a customizable fashion. Discussion with Will Smythe of Smythe and Sons, LLC, 
bushels are priced in 25,000 to 50,000 bu increments. 
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predetermined basis level, which equals the $Pspot-$Pfutures. This research uses the Memphis grain 
elevator for the baseline or benchmark comparison against other strategies.  
Futures Contracts and Futures Hedging 
Futures are one way that agents participating in the grain market can smooth returns and help 
to hedge losses along with mitigating risk.  A futures contract is a way to agree upon a price for a 
commodity at a specific point in time for a specific amount of the product.  In the case of corn, 
futures contracts are traded at 1,000 and 5,000 bushels. For this research, the larger contracts of 
5,000 bushels (127 metric tons) are studied. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange & Chicago Board 
of Trade is where futures originated in the U.S. and have existed for centuries beginning in Osaka, 
Japan, on the Dojima exchange to trade and hedge using rice futures (Schaede (1989). 
Futures came into being so that traders and hedgers could agree upon a price into the future at 
a certain time for a commodity.  Tomek and Peterson (2001), Carter (1999), and Fama and French 
(1987) define futures as: 
 Ft=E [FT, It], 
Where: 
F is the price of futures, t is the current date, E is the expectation term, T as the maturity 
date, and I as the information set, so that the current futures price equals the expected futures price 
based on current knowledge of information set I.  Futures contracts approaching maturity tend to 
converge to the cash price as uncertainty is diminished when harvest time is near. With the 
evolution of information sets on a day to day, and even minute by minute basis, it can be concluded 
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that futures changes will be subject to the change in net positive and net negative news in the eyes 
of investors and market participants.  
Basis plays a role in determining the value of a deliverable commodity and the actual price 
received at the elevator.  The basis is equivalent to the cash spot price, P(s), minus futures.  A 
negative basis means that prices at the grain elevator are lower than the futures quote, while a 
positive basis indicates a spot price above the current futures contract in question. The inventory 
and capacity held at an elevator, along with demand, determines basis level. More favorable basis 
occurs when the elevator has greater need and a more negative basis occurs because inventory 
needs have been met which lead to a decrease in demand. The basis will differ upon location; 
therefore, quantifying the transport costs with the various basis bids can help producers figure out 
which location will be the most profitable. When a favorable basis is available, more grain arrives 
at that location. When the inventory becomes stocked, the basis recedes and declines because of 
lower demand and need for more stocks. By using this basis difference, a hedge can be 
implemented that allows for more desirable returns compared to accepting the cash price outright. 
Benefits, Limitations, and Characteristics of Futures Contracts 
1. Futures of number two corn grain have large open interest and liquidity in the
market, essentially guaranteeing a buyer for every seller.
2. Standardization of contracts keeps things simple when formulating the contract
and deciding how many bushels to hedge, as futures contracts for corn are either
5,000 or 1,000 bushels in size.
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3. The counterparty default risk that is present in other marketing strategies is
eliminated because payment is guaranteed by Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
clearing house.
4. Basis risk remains when hedging using futures.
a. Costs of entering into futures contracts should be accounted for. Brokerage
fees and margin requirements are involved and need to be taken into
consideration.
b. Hedging is a zero-sum game; therefore, a gain in one account, cash or futures,
means that a loss will occur in the other and vice versa.
Futures offer a highly used, liquid market for number two corn grain. In fact, it is one of 
the most popular ways to mitigate the movement in price.  Two parties agree on terms and 
conditions for bushels priced (5,000 bushels per contract) for agreed upon price in the future, 
without needing to deliver the physical commodity. Next, an example of hedging using futures is 
given. 
A producer wishes to hedge against future price movement in the cash grain market.  
After careful deliberation and analysis, farmer John in Helena, Arkansas, decides that the hedge 
will be placed in the month of May for multiple December corn contracts (symbolized on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT as CZ, with Z indicating maturity date). The farmer decides that 
the ample liquidity in the market and the right to sell at a guaranteed price without the obligation 
for delivery offers the best opportunity for hedging against lower harvest prices in October. 
Assuming that on the day of hedging, the price available on the Chicago Board of Trade is high 
enough to cover 100% of his operation’s total costs plus profit margin.  We will say that cost per 
bushel on his farm for the current year is $3.50, and the current futures price is $4.00.  He 
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decides to lock in this price of $4.00 per bushel with 10 futures contracts to hedge the price on 
50,000 bushels of corn by selling futures. Once harvest arrives on October 1, farmer John takes 
his bushels to the Memphis, Tennessee, elevator that is offering a spot price of 375 cents per 
bushel at a basis of -5 under that day’s future price of $3.80 per bushel and sells his grain to the 
elevator.  He simultaneously buys back the 10 contracts on October 1, and the difference in the 
spot and futures accrues to his margin account used to buy and sell futures.  This amount is the 
price he entered the contract at, $4.00, minus $3.80, which equals 20 cents per bushel on 50,000 
bushels that accrues to farmer John’s margin. In total, farmer John was able to receive 
.20*50,000 bushels, totaling a ten-thousand-dollar gain over what he would have received by 
only selling his corn on the spot market. He captures a higher price in the futures market by 
entering into the December corn contract in May, while covering his cost of production by 
12.85%, calculated by (((375+20)-350)/350). 
((PS+ (∆Ft, FT)-Cp)/Cp 
PS = the Memphis spot price on October 1 
(∆Ft, FT) = the change in futures price for new crop December corn (CZ) from the time it 
was entered into in May and at the price that it was bought back on October 1, for the December 
Corn contract FT. 
Cp = the cost of production per bushel. 
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Table 1- Scenarios of futures hedges that a producer could experience: 
Upward Moving Cash and 
Downward Moving Futures 
Date Cash Futures Basis 
14-May Need 350 Sell 400 Expected=50 
1-Oct Sell 375 Buy 380 Actual=-5 
375 20 Effective Price of 395 
Grain/Loss 25 20 45 
Upward Moving Market 
Date Cash Futures Basis 
14-May Need 350 Sell 400 Expected=-50 
1-Oct Sell 375 Buy 418 Actual=-43 
375 -18 Effective Price of 357 
Grain/Loss 25 -18 7 
Worst Case Scenario: 
Downward Moving Cash and 
Upward Moving Futures 
Date Cash Futures Basis 
14-May Need 350 Sell 350 Expected=0; even 
1-Oct 325 Buy 354 Actual=-29 
335 20 Effective Price of 321 
Grain/Loss -15 10 -29
Downward Moving Market 
Date Cash Futures Basis 
14-May Need 350 Sell 355 Expected=-5 
1-Oct Sell 335 Buy 345 Actual=-15 
335 20 Effective Price of 345 
Grain/Loss -15 10 -5
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Implementing Strategies 
The pre-harvest marketing strategies are implemented over the May 1 to October 1 
marketing window. The beginning date of May 1 corresponds to a time period when farmers 
have made most of their initial production decisions, with planting particularly in mind.   
Forward and Futures Hedging Strategies Based Upon Cost of Production Coverage Criteria 
Three forward and three futures strategies use a percentage of production costs to 
determine when they are set. These strategies are analyzed daily using December new crop corn 
closing future prices and Memphis forward cash prices for new crop delivery. The first time in 
the marketing window when futures prices adjusted for expected harvest time basis or forward 
prices are greater than a designated threshold, determined by a percentage coverage of 
production costs (100%, 125%, and 150%), the respective futures/forward strategy is 
implemented. Expected harvest basis for any one crop year is estimated as a three- year moving 
average of previous year’s harvest basis levels. 
Hedge selection price equals forward/futures price acceptance where the forward contract 
price at the Memphis grain terminal, or futures price adjusted for harvest expected basis, is 
greater than the average Arkansas corn cost of production:  
Forward Contract Level=Frw$p Cost of 
Production= CoP100%,125%,150%
Frw$p ≥ CoP100%
Frw$p ≥ CoP125% 
Frw$p ≥ CoP150%
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Futures Price Level= F$p 
Cost of Production= CoP100%,125%,150% 
F$p  ≥  CoP100% 
F$p ≥  CoP125% 
F$p ≥  CoP150% 
If prices never reach a level over the window which allows the strategy to be implemented, it is 
assumed for that particular crop year that our hypothetical farmer sells his corn in the cash 
market on October 1. This method gives us six different futures/forward contract marketing 
strategies, three forward pricing contracts at the respective coverage levels and three futures at 
those same levels.   
Average Price Contracts 
Average price contracts for corn allow an agent to market grain in intervals over a negotiated 
amount of time. Bushels are marketed each week throughout a contracted time period, allowing 
marketers to smooth returns over that time. These contracts are more attractive alternatives for 
producers with a higher level of risk aversion. By allowing a farmer to price a specified number 
of bushels over time, market peaks and troughs are smoothed throughout the growing season. 
This allows upside potential with downside protection, while fitting a relatively risk-averse 
producer profile. These types of contracts have been heavily promoted by grain merchandising 
firms in recent years and referred to as “new generation contracts.” For illustration purposes we 





       The pre-harvest marketing strategies are implemented over the May 1 to October 1 
marketing window. The beginning date of May 1 corresponds to a time period when farmers 
have made most of their initial production decisions, with planting particularly in mind.   
Forward and Futures Hedging Strategies based upon Cost of production coverage criteria 
One set of strategies use a percentage of production costs to determine when they are set. 
These strategies are analyzed on a daily basis using December new crop corn closing future 
prices and Memphis forward cash prices for new crop delivery. The first time in the marketing 
window when futures prices adjusted for expected harvest time basis or forward prices are 
greater than a designated threshold, determined by a percentage coverage of production costs 
(100%, 125%, and 150%), the respective futures/forward strategy is implemented. Expected 
harvest basis for any one crop year is estimated as a 3-year moving average of previous year’s 
harvest basis levels. 
Hedge Selection Price= Forward Price Acceptance where the forward contract price at 
the Memphis grain terminal, or futures price adjusted for harvest expected basis, is greater than 
the average Arkansas corn cost of production:  
Forward Contract Level=Frw$p 
Cost of Production= CoP100%,125%,150% 
Frw$p ≥ CoP100% 
Frw$p ≥ CoP125% 
Frw$p ≥ CoP150% 
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            If prices never reach a level over the window which allows the strategy to be 
implemented, it is assumed for that crop year that our hypothetical farmers sell their corn in the 
cash market on October 1. This method gives us six different futures/forward contract marketing 
strategies.  
Average Price Contracting Strategies 
May, June, July, and both June and July taken together, are average time periods 
considered and tested with Average price contracts in following sections. The strategy titled 
Average Price Contract is analyzed by taking the average forward cash price observed each 
Wednesday following the May (WASDE) release date until October 1 for each crop year over 
the 2001-2017 sample period. Tests are run between different average contracts based on 
different months through the growing season. The average contract periods for the following 
strategies are May, June, July, and a combination June and July average period. Average returns 
and profit for each period’s averaging contract are compared in the results section. The results 
can guide producers in realizing risk and returns available in different times of the year on 
average. 
WASDE S/U & WASDE Average Price strategies 
The two WASDE based strategies use projected corn stocks to use ratios and average 
national cash corn price forecasts for the forthcoming crop year – taken from the May WASDE 
report each year of the sample period – to estimate expected harvest-time cash price in the 
Memphis corn market. The idea is to utilize government information released at the beginning of 
our pre-harvest marketing window and pertaining to current expectations about corn supply and 
demand. Ordinary least squares regressions are used to model the relationship between Memphis 
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harvest-time cash prices and these WASDE information variables. The regressions are estimated 
for an in-sample period (1995 - 2000) and parameter estimates are used to forecast Memphis 
harvest-time cash prices out-of-sample, where the out-of-sample period corresponds to the 
sample period (2001- 2017) used to analyze all of our pre-harvest marketing strategies12. The 
WASDE marketing strategies are implemented by picking first day in each crop year marketing 
window that the higher of either forwards or futures prices adjusted for expected harvest basis 
levels are greater than the OLS Memphis harvest-time cash price forecasts.   
The OLS regression methods are now discussed in more detail. The Memphis corn 
October 1 harvest cash bid is regressed upon the May WASDE average price for one regression, 
and upon the May WASDE stocks to use ratios for the other regression. The first model is 
regressed upon the WASDE average price estimates, while the second OLS model is using the 
same dependent variable regressed on WASDE projected stock to use.   
WASDE S/U Price 
The alpha (intercept) represents the harvest-time Memphis cash price on average 
for the in-sample period at a level of 429.66 cents/bu. The WASDE projected s/u coefficient has 
a value of -12.60 cents/bu and is significant at the 1% level. The regression fit the in-sample data 
well with an R-squared value of 0.93 and residual diagnostics indicated there were no 
autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity issues. To calculate the forecasted Memphis harvest-time 
cash price we added alpha to the WASDE projected s/u beta coefficient multiplied by the stocks 
to use ratio observed for each crop year in the out-of-sample period. 
12 The OLS regressions were also estimated for the full sample period (1995 - 2017) and the paramter estimates were 
found to be robust and not sensitive to sample period. 
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α=intercept of average Memphis spot price on October 1 
β=Memphis harvest-time cents per bushel cash price reaction to a 1% increase in stocks 
to use. 
x=(Supplyend stocks/Demandtotal use)*100 
Therefore, for every 1% increase in the stock to use ratio, there is an expected change in 
the Memphis harvest-time cash price level of -12.60 cents.   
WASDE Average Price 
The alpha (intercept) of -126.31 cents per bushel represents the average difference 
between the harvest-time Memphis cash price relative to the WASDE national average price 
forecast for the in-sample period. In other words, harvest-time Memphis cash price was on 
average 126.31 cents per bushel below the USDA estimate in the WASDE reports. The WASDE 
projected average price coefficient has a value of 1.446 cents/bu and is significant at the 5% 
level. The regression fit the in-sample data well with an R-squared value of 0.78 and residual 
diagnostics indicated there were no autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity issues. The battery of 
residual tests includes the Ljung-Box Q Test and the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests for 
autocorrelation, and the Breusch-Pagan Heteroscedasticity test. 
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To calculate the forecasted Memphis harvest-time cash price we added alpha to the 
WASDE projected average price coefficient multiplied by the WASDE average price observed 
for each crop year in the out-of-sample period. 
Where WASDE Average Price comes from the amount of WASDE report national 
average price projections. 
y=α+β(x) 
y=harvest price 
α=intercept of average Memphis spot price on October 1 
β=price reaction for a 1% increase in WASDE national average price projection. 
 x=WASDE Average Price from (1995-2000) 
Therefore, for every 1 cent per bushel increase in the WASDE average price estimation, 
there is a corresponding 1.45 cent/bu increase in the average Memphis harvest-time cash 
price on October 1. 
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OLS Regressions Results Table for Memphis Spot Price Regressed on WASDE S/U and 
WASDE Average Price. 
Table 2 
WASDE Stock to Use 
R2 0.93 
Adjusted R2 0.91 
Constant 429.67 
Standard Error 27.72 
WASDE Stock to Use Coefficient -12.61 
Standard Error 1.74 
p-value 0.00 
WASDE Average Price R2 0.78 
Adjusted R2 0.73 
Constant  -126.31
Standard Error 96.49 
WASDE Price Forecast Coefficient 1.45 
Standard Error 0.38 
p-value 0.018 
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Table 3 OLS Regressions Residual Tests 
WASDE Average Price  
Regression 
Statistics Residual Test statistic p-value
Autocorrelation LBQ lag 1 0.14 0.71
Autocorrelation LBQ lag 2 0.15 0.93 
Autocorrelation 
Breusch 
Godfrey 1.03 0.31 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch Pagan 0.07 0.79 
WASDE Stock to Use 
Regression 
Statistics Residual Test statistic p-value
Autocorrelation LBQ lag 1 2.2 0.13
Autocorrelation LBQ lag 2 2.36 0.31 
Autocorrelation 
Breusch 
Godfrey 1.5 0.22 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch Pagan 0.071 0.79 
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Chapter IV Data 
As already noted, WASDE stock to use ratios and national average crop year cash price 
projections were taken from the May WASDE reports each year (World Agricultural Supply and 
Demand Estimates, USDA). In addition, total specified production cost data was collected from 
the University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture (2018) Extension service for a typical furrow 
irrigated, roundup ready and bt stacked corn farm. Also, Arkansas average corn yields measured 
in bushels per acre were taken from USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA, 
AMS, 2018). 
Memphis FOB13 terminal harvest-time spot cash bids observed on October 1 each crop 
year and Memphis FOB new crop daily forward bids observed from May 1 through October 1 
each crop year were taken from the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA, 
NASS, 2018). Daily CBOT December corn futures closing prices observed from May 1 through 
October 1 each crop year were also collected. 
 Production costs and pricing strtagies are both crucial for the success and increased 
profitability for a farming operation. Capturing all costs and benefits for producers has proven to 
be a difficult task, as each farmer has specific interests and risk preferences.  This has caused 
complexity in research in the attempt to quantify results. Due to this complexity, statewide yields 
and total specified costs of production14 for Arkansas are used instead of farm specific data in 
order to depict the average Arkansas farming constraints. Because of differences among 
individual farms, aspects of operations’ objectives differ subject to their preferences which tend 
13 FOB or Free on Board is a designation for the point in which transfer of traded goods change ownership. FOB 
means that when a good leaves the seller’s warehouse, the buyer takes full responsibility for it, incurring all delivery 
costs. This contrasts with Cost, Insurance, and Freight, or CIF, where the seller is responsible for transport costs 
until the container is loaded onto the ship and crosses its rail.   
14 Total specified costs from the University of Arkansas enterprise budgets includes the average annual Arkansas 
production costs per acre for stacked, roundup ready number two corn grain, which is grown in furrow irrigated, 
loamy soil. 
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to be based around input costs and expected returns, along with the acceptable level of profit 
margin specific to the operation.  Average Arkansas production costs per acre for stacked, 
roundup ready, furrow irrigated, loamy soil, are divided by the yield15 in bushels per acre to get 
production costs per bushel, which in turn is used to cover total specified production costs (COP) 
levels at breakeven (b.e.), 125% of COP, and 150% of COP.  By dividing production costs in 
dollars per acre by bushels per acre average yield and multiply by 100, we calculate the price in 
cents per bushel needed to cover production expenses.  
BEprice =(COP/Yield) *100=cost of producing one bushel of corn in cents 
BEprice =Break-even price 
COP=$/acre 
Yield=bushels/acre 
After the BEprice calculation, coverage levels are calculated by simply multiplying by 
1.25, and 1.5 for 125% COP, and 150% COP respectively. Decision rules were implemented 
across all sample years (2001-2017) that would indicate if COP was covered with a “yes” or 
“no” statement in Microsoft Excel®.  
15 The yield data is an Arkansas statewide average and does not specify for stacked, roundup ready, furrow irrigated, 
loamy soil. Cost per bushel is likely biased in one direction or another. I would guess biased upwards. Bias may be 
in the other measures, e.g. risk. This should be noted as a limitation. 
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Chapter V Results 
Comparisons of each strategy through parametric and nonparametric tests were 
conducted through StatTools7®, a Palisade ®add-on for Microsoft Excel®. These tests 
comprised parametric t- tests (one and two tailed), an F-test for equal variances; nonparametric 
one and two-sided sign tests, Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and chi-squared tests for normality.  
Results have been compiled into tables for price received, profit per bushel, and profit per acre 
and are presented below. Along with the significance tests, coefficients of variation are also 
calculated for standardized comparisons of riskiness across strategies and to rank the various 
strategies by both risk and return. The minimum coefficient of variation is used to choose the 
number one strategy with the lowest risk relative to returns. The highest coefficient of variation 
percentage indicates the riskiest strategy relative to returns. 
First, we present results in tables 4-6 comparing each of the pre-harvest marketing 
strategies through Coefficient of Variation (CV%) Ranking to determine which strategies rank 
best and worst in terms of their relative returns and returns-risk. The best performing strategy has 
the lowest CV% ratio, and the worst strategy has the highest CV% ratio.  
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Av May Av 
June 




182.00 188.75 188.75 200.33 182.00 182.00 182.00 182.00 182.00 182.00 192.36 187.86 207.14 197.50 
2002 252.00 247.50 218.25 231.21 252.25 252.00 252.00 236.00 252.00 252.00 198.39 205.40 224.90 215.39 
2003 218.00 218.00 246.25 227.79 247.25 218.00 218.00 234.00 218.00 218.00 240.12 235.95 212.95 224.19 
2004 187.00 187.00 298.25 244.48 300.75 187.00 187.00 316.00 187.00 187.00 293.45 286.29 235.19 260.74 
2005 176.00 189.50 189.50 220.58 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 216.95 229.05 234.15 231.48 
2006 279.00 279.00 293.00 239.25 279.00 279.00 279.00 275.50 279.00 279.00 247.75 237.77 234.90 236.40 
2007 366.00 371.75 414.75 319.82 375.75 375.75 387.75 342.50 342.50 366.00 344.55 354.90 295.55 325.23 
2008 439.00 586.50 720.00 568.24 586.50 586.50 586.50 582.00 582.00 582.00 566.31 655.95 592.41 623.44 
2009 339.00 446.50 339.00 349.52 431.75 339.00 339.00 388.00 388.00 339.00 397.83 396.14 318.27 357.20 
2010 451.00 378.25 478.00 383.15 392.50 498.50 451.00 388.50 488.00 451.00 359.80 339.09 360.71 349.65 
2011 586.00 625.00 561.00 691.43 654.75 654.75 654.75 688.50 688.50 688.50 680.55 695.73 670.43 684.15 
2012 725.50 476.00 592.75 654.47 507.50 507.50 592.75 530.00 530.00 594.00 511.11 532.17 735.05 633.61 
2013 417.00 517.00 626.50 513.98 526.00 526.00 417.00 553.00 553.00 553.00 552.18 569.18 511.11 538.76 
2014 296.00 473.50 296.00 387.69 474.25 474.25 296.00 497.00 497.00 296.00 482.29 435.84 373.82 404.83 
2015 371.50 361.25 427.75 369.24 363.00 371.50 371.45 357.50 371.45 371.45 358.68 365.30 404.00 384.65 
2016 333.50 373.00 417.50 366.21 384.00 333.50 333.50 384.00 333.50 333.50 389.05 418.09 357.33 390.75 
2017 301.00 336.75 301.00 355.50 344.00 301.00 301.00 376.50 301.00 301.00 370.60 373.14 368.84 371.10                
Average 348 368 389 372 381 368 354 383 375 363 377 383 373 378 
std dev 146 139 161 152 137 149 147 146 157 158 142 155 164 156 
CV% 42.04% 37.70% 41.37% 40.96% 35.95% 40.57% 41.54% 38.19% 41.89% 43.57% 37.79% 40.30% 43.96% 41.18% 
Rank 12 2 9 7 1 6 10 4 11 13 3 5 14 8 
min 176.00 187.00 188.75 200.33 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 176.00 192.36 187.86 207.14 197.50 




2.09 7.47 5.92 4.48 0.63 1.30 3.52 1.22 2.42 5.87 1.32 5.04 3.90 14.80 
p-value 0.55 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.89 0.73 0.32 0.75 0.49 0.12 0.73 0.17 0.27 0.00 
16 The statistical significance key is only used for the chi squared results. 
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The top three strategies from prices received in terms of minimum CV% are 
1. Futures 100% coverage of total costs of production17
2. WASDE Stocks to Use
3. Average May pricing contract
Clearly the Futures 100% COP strategy performs well both in terms of yielding a relatively 
high average price and a relatively low standard deviation of price compared with the harvest-
time October cash benchmark strategy. Indeed, the harvest-time October cash benchmark 
strategy ranks lower than all but two of the pre-harvest marketing strategies. Also, notably, 
although the WASDE average price strategy performs well in terms of yielding a high average 
price it is riskier than most other strategies.  
17 Because futures prices are not totally predictable, the first price to meet the threshold may be equal or greater than 
the cost of production. The futures 100% coverage of total costs of production strategy has the main goal of 
covering at least the cost of production. So, because the futures price may be greater than the COP level, profit 
margin is possible. Anticipation of higher prices can be considered speculating if a marketer does not enter the 
hedge the first-time futures is equal to or greater than COP. 
43 






























Av May Av June Av July Average 
June/July 
2001 2.20 219.87 -37.87 -31.12 -31.12 -19.54 -37.87 -37.87 -37.87 -37.87 -37.87 -37.87 -27.51 -32.01 -12.73 -22.37
2002 2.33 233.42 18.58 14.08 -15.17 -2.20 18.83 18.58 18.58 2.58 18.58 18.58 -35.03 -28.02 -8.51 -18.03
2003 2.28 228.25 -10.25 -10.25 18.00 -0.46 19.00 -10.25 -10.25 5.75 -10.25 -10.25 11.87 7.70 -15.30 -4.06
2004 2.33 233.44 -46.44 -46.44 64.81 11.03 67.31 -46.44 -46.44 82.56 -46.44 -46.44 60.01 52.84 1.75 27.30 
2005 2.65 264.63 -88.63 -75.13 -75.13 -44.06 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -47.68 -35.59 -30.48 -33.16
2006 2.86 286.29 -7.29 -7.29 6.71 -47.04 -7.29 -7.29 -7.29 -10.79 -7.29 -7.29 -38.54 -48.52 -51.39 -49.88
2007 2.53 252.52 113.48 119.23 162.23 67.30 123.23 123.23 135.23 89.98 89.98 113.48 92.02 102.38 43.03 72.71 
2008 3.07 307.29 131.71 279.21 412.71 260.95 279.21 279.21 279.21 274.71 274.71 274.71 259.02 348.66 285.12 316.15 
2009 3.91 391.03 -52.03 55.47 -52.03 -41.50 40.72 -52.03 -52.03 -3.03 -3.03 -52.03 6.80 5.11 -72.76 -33.82
2010 3.86 385.81 65.19 -7.56 92.19 -2.66 6.69 112.69 65.19 2.69 102.19 65.19 -26.01 -46.72 -25.10 -36.16
2011 4.27 427.27 158.73 197.73 133.73 264.16 227.48 227.48 227.48 261.23 261.23 261.23 253.28 268.46 243.16 256.88 
2012 3.81 381.08 344.42 94.92 211.67 273.39 126.42 126.42 211.67 148.92 148.92 212.92 130.03 151.08 353.96 252.52 
2013 3.68 367.82 49.18 149.18 258.68 146.15 158.18 158.18 49.18 185.18 185.18 185.18 184.36 201.35 143.29 170.94 
2014 3.34 333.53 -37.53 139.97 -37.53 54.16 140.72 140.72 -37.53 163.47 163.47 -37.53 148.75 102.31 40.28 71.29 
2015 3.54 354.29 17.21 6.96 73.46 14.95 8.71 17.21 17.16 3.21 17.16 17.16 4.38 11.00 49.71 30.35 
2016 3.63 363.23 -29.73 9.77 54.27 2.98 20.77 -29.73 -29.73 20.77 -29.73 -29.73 25.82 54.86 -5.90 27.52 
2017 3.39 339.18 -38.18 -2.43 -38.18 16.32 4.82 -38.18 -38.18 37.32 -38.18 -38.18 31.42 33.96 29.66 31.92 
Average 3.16 316 32 52 73 56 65 53 39 67 59 47 61 68 57 62 
std dev 0.65 67 107 96 130 110 97 109 110 105 112 118 101 116 124 116 
CV% 20.68% 21.32% 328.96% 184.69% 178.11% 196.64% 148.65% 206.70% 284.64% 157.08% 190.64% 249.86% 165.52% 171.57% 218.68% 185.25% 
Rank 14 6 5 9 1 10 13 2 8 12 3 4 11 7 
min 2.20 219.87 -88.63 -75.13 -75.13 -47.04 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -88.63 -47.68 -48.52 -72.76 -49.88




8.33 7.47 3.57 15.09 2.63 7.20 10.32 4.37 5.48 13.34 6.49 7.74 18.16 14.80 
p-value 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.00 0.45 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 
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The top three strategies in terms of profit per bushel are: 
1. Futures 100% coverage of total cost of production
2. Forward 100% coverage of total cost of production
3. Average May pricing contract
The rankings in terms of profits per bushel are like those for price received per bushel, and 
once again the Futures 100% COP strategy performs the best of out of all of the strategies. 
Interestingly, in this case the harvest-time October cash benchmark strategy now ranks lower 
than all other strategies. 
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Av May Av June Av July 
2001 $318.81 31881.00 145.00 -54.91 -45.12 -45.12 -28.33 -54.91 -54.91 -54.91 -54.91 -54.91 -54.91 -39.88 -46.42 -18.45
2002 $312.78 31278.00 134.00 24.90 18.87 -20.33 -2.95 25.24 24.90 24.90 3.46 24.90 24.90 -46.94 -37.54 -11.41
2003 $319.55 31955.00 140.00 -14.35 -14.35 25.20 -0.65 26.60 -14.35 -14.35 8.05 -14.35 -14.35 16.62 10.78 -21.41
2004 $326.82 32682.00 140.00 -65.02 -65.02 90.73 15.45 94.23 -65.02 -65.02 115.58 -65.02 -65.02 84.01 73.98 2.45 
2005 $346.67 34667.00 131.00 -116.11 -98.43 -98.43 -57.72 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -62.46 -46.62 -39.93
2006 $417.98 41798.00 146.00 -10.64 -10.64 9.80 -68.68 -10.64 -10.64 -10.64 -15.75 -10.64 -10.64 -56.27 -70.83 -75.03
2007 $426.76 42676.00 169.00 191.78 201.50 274.17 113.73 208.26 208.26 228.54 152.07 152.07 191.78 155.52 173.03 72.714 
2008 $467.08 46708.00 152.00 200.20 424.40 627.32 396.64 424.40 424.40 424.40 417.56 417.56 417.56 393.71 529.97 433.38 
2009 $578.72 57872.00 148.00 -77.00 82.10 -77.00 -61.42 60.27 -77.00 -77.00 -4.48 -4.48 -77.00 10.06 7.56 -107.68
2010 $578.72 57872.00 150.00 97.78 -11.35 138.28 -4.00 10.03 169.03 97.78 4.03 153.28 97.78 -39.02 -70.09 -37.65
2011 $602.45 60245.00 141.00 223.81 278.80 188.56 372.46 320.75 320.75 320.75 368.34 368.34 368.34 357.12 378.53 342.85 
2012 $678.33 67833.00 178.00 613.06 168.95 376.77 486.63 225.02 225.02 376.77 265.07 265.07 378.99 231.45 268.93 630.05 
2013 $684.15 68415.00 186.00 91.47 277.47 481.14 271.84 294.21 294.21 91.47 344.43 344.43 344.43 342.91 374.52 266.52 
2014 $623.71 62371.00 187.00 -70.19 261.74 -70.19 101.27 263.14 263.14 -70.19 305.68 305.68 -70.19 278.17 191.31 75.33 
2015 $641.27 64127.00 181.00 31.15 12.59 132.96 27.05 15.76 31.15 31.05 5.81 31.05 31.05 7.93 19.91 89.97 
2016 $621.13 62113.00 171.00 -50.85 16.70 92.80 5.10 35.51 -50.85 -50.85 35.51 -50.85 -50.85 44.15 93.80 -10.09
2017 $620.70 62070.00 183.00 -69.87 -4.45 -69.87 29.86 8.82 -69.87 -69.87 68.29 -69.87 -69.87 57.50 62.15 54.28 
Average 503.86 50386 158 56 88 121 94 108 88 63 112 99 78 102 113 97 
std dev 141 14142 20 178 151 211 176 152 170 171 166 177 186 159 181 203 
CV% 28.07% 28.07% 12.50% 320.83% 171.93% 174.25% 187.24% 140.81% 192.87% 272.89% 147.96% 179.98% 239.05% 155.62% 160.57% 209.35% 
Rank 14 5 6 9 1 10 13 2 8 12 3 4 11 
min 312.78 31278.00 131.00 -116.11 -98.43 -98.43 -68.68 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -116.11 -62.46 -70.83 -107.68
max 684.15 68415.00 187.00 613.06 424.40 627.32 486.63 424.40 424.40 424.40 417.56 417.56 417.56 393.71 529.97 630.05 
Chi 
Squared 
Stat 7.76 10.55 5.41 14.99 2.55 6.62 8.74 6.30 5.96 11.81 11.81 11.68 15.60 
p-value 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.47 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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Top three strategies in terms of profit per acre are: 
1. Futures 100% coverage of total cost of production
2. Forward 100% coverage of total cost of production
3. Average May
Regarding profit per acre the rankings are identical to the profit per bushel rankings, 
which is not surprising as the calculation of profit per acre is almost perfectly correlated with the 
profit per bushel calculation. Although there is 99% correlation, there is a larger magnitude for 
profit per acre which is possibly due to the inclusion of yield in its calculation for dollars per acre 
profit. However, we believe it is informative to present the results as it is of interest to see what 
the profit levels are in terms of dollars per acre for each strategy. Although, our coefficient of 
variation (CV%) analysis provides us with straightforward way to rank the various strategies 
both in terms of relative returns and risk we are left asking the question as to whether average 
returns (price and profits) from our pre-harvest marketing strategies are significantly different 
from the benchmark harvest-time cash sale strategy. And from a purely risk perspective if the 
variance of returns (prices and profits) are significantly different from the benchmark harvest-
time cash sale strategy. 
With these question in mind, we turn to tables 7-9, which present results of the 
parametric and nonparametric tests to determine if the various pre-harvesting marketing 
strategies yield significantly different prices per bushel, profits per bushel and profits per acre 
compared with the benchmark harvest-time cash sale strategy.  
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Parametric Results 
First, with respect to our parametric results we can see that none of the strategies yield 
significantly different prices or profits compared with the harvest-time cash sale strategy, 
irrespective of whether we use a one or two tailed t-test (Tables 7-9). We can conclude, that 
based upon our parametric results, it is not possible to generate higher prices or profits using pre-
harvest marketing strategies compared with simply selling each year in the harvest-time cash 
market. This result is consistent with efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and supports the 
conclusion reached by Zulauf and Irwin (1998) that pre-harvest marketing strategies are not able 
to generate higher farm incomes than simply selling in the cash market at harvest time.  In 
addition, our F-tests also indicate that the variance of prices and profits for all the pre-harvest 
strategies are not statistically different from the benchmark harvest-time cash sale strategy. This 
implies that there are no advantages to using pre-harvest marketing strategies to reduce harvest-
time price risk, at least not with respect to a year to year comparison.   
 Chi-Squared Tests for normality 
However, further testing for non-normality reveals that the profit per bushel and the profit 
per acre distributions associated with most of the strategies are not normal. The relevant chi-
squared test results with respect to non-normality are presented at the foot of tables 4, 5 and 6. 
This is less true with respect to the price per bushel received distributions, with our tests showing 
only two strategies (WASDE stocks to use, and average price during June and July) are not 
normally distributed.  
Given the prevalence of non-normality we proceed to analyze the question of whether 
returns (price and profits) generated by pre-harvest marketing strategies are greater than 
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benchmark harvest-time cash returns using two well-known nonparametric tests – the Sign test 
and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.  
Nonparametric Results 
The Sign test uses a hypothesized median difference between the returns of each pre-
harvest strategy and the benchmark harvest-time cash sale strategy of 0 then assigns values that 
are greater than this for the one-sided test, and values less than or greater than 0 for two-sided 
testing. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test ranks samples and gives them a sign and rank to test if 
median differences in he returns of each pre-harvest strategy and the benchmark harvest-time 
cash sale strategy differ from 0 as shown by positive and negative summed ranks. Results and p-
values are presented for each respective measure: price received, profit per bushel, and profit per 
acre (Tables 7-9).
49 
Table 7 Strategy Statistical Tests for Prices Received 2001-2017 




























median differences 6.75 14.00 18.33 29.25 0.00 0.00 16.00 0.00 0.00 40.95 53.05 25.14 18.20 
Mean Differences 19.57 40.51 23.73 32.81 20.16 6.19 34.56 26.44 14.70 28.38 35.20 24.54 29.97 
Tests 
T-test 0.56 1.00 0.64 0.94 0.55 0.17 0.96 0.71 0.38 0.80 0.93 0.62 0.79 
2-sided p value 0.58 0.32 0.53 0.35 0.59 0.87 0.34 0.49 0.70 0.43 0.36 0.54 0.43 
1-sided p value 0.29 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.17 0.2428 0.3519 0.2139 0.1804 0.2691 0.22 
F test of equal sample variances 0.84 1.45 1.05 0.82 1.03 1.05 0.95 1.11 1.21 0.88 1.17 1.34 1.15 
p value 0.73 0.47 0.92 0.70 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.78 
Sign Test 2-sided >, < HM 0 11,4 12,3 11,6 11,3 9,1 6,2 9,6 6,3 3,2 11,6 11,6 11,6 12,5 
p value 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.61 0.51 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 
Sign Test 1-sided >HM 0 11 12 11 11 9 6 9 6 3 11 11 11 12 
p value 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.30 0.25 0.5 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.07 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test stat 88 94 106 82 45 25 87 34 11 108 108 108 109.00 
p value 2 sided 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.38 0.14 0.20 0.44 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
p value 1 sided 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Chi-Square Normality Test 7.47 5.92 4.48 0.63 1.30 3.52 1.22 2.42 5.87 1.32 5.04 3.90 14.80 
p-value 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.89 0.73 0.32 0.75 0.49 0.12 0.73 0.17 0.27 0.00 
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Price received per bushel (see Table 7) 
First, with respect to our price received per bushel results, we focus attention on the two 
cases of non-normality, relating to the WASDE stocks to use, and average price during June and 
July strategies. The one tailed Sign and Rank tests both indicate that the two strategies prices are 
on average higher than the harvest-time cash sale benchmark at the 10% level (Table 7). No 
statistical difference between the two strategies and the benchmark is found using two tailed 
tests. Thus, there is some weak evidence that the WASDE stocks to use, and average price 
during June and July strategies may yield significantly higher prices than those obtainable at 
harvest time. Regarding the average price strategy during June and July this would be consistent 
with the notion that a Wisner type risk-premium may be embedded in prices during this period 
when yields are less certain. However, this strategy is subject to much risk as highlighted by the 
large estimates of price volatility (standard deviation) associated with it and presented in table 1. 
Profit per bushel and Profit per acre (see Table 8 &9) 
Again, focusing on strategies where we found evidence of non-normality, both one and 
two tailed Sign and Rank tests indicate that several pre-harvest strategies (WASDE average 
price, futures hedge with 100% COP, and futures hedge at 125% COP) generate profits that are 
significantly different and larger than the harvest-time cash sale benchmark strategy at the 5% 
level (Tables 8 and 9). In addition, one tailed Sign and Rank tests show that WASDE stocks to 
use and average price during June and July strategies are significantly larger than the harvest-
time cash sale benchmark strategy at the 10% level. Finally, based on the one tailed Rank test 
alone, several of the average price strategies (average price contract, and average prices during 
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May, June, and July) are all statistically larger than the harvest-time cash sale benchmark 
strategy at the 10% level.  
Therefore, in summary, taking the profit results overall, there is substantial nonparametric 
evidence to indicate that a wide range of pre-harvest marketing strategies yield significantly 
larger profits than the harvest-time cash sale benchmark strategy.  Thus, in a nonparametric/non-
normal world our results provide supporting evidence to Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin (1998) 
results. One important caveat to note is that our nonparametric tests do not allow us to determine 
if the pre-harvest marketing strategies are significantly less risky than the harvest-time cash sale 
benchmark strategy.  
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Av  May Av June Av July Av June/July 
median 
differences 
6.75 14 18.33 29.25 0.00 0 16 0 0 40.95 53.05 18.20 18.20 
mean differences 19.57 40.51 23.73 32.81 20.16 6.19 34.56 26.44 14.7 28.38 35.2 24.54 29.97 
Tests 
T-stat 0.56 1.00 0.64 0.94 0.55 0.17 0.96 0.71 0.38 0.80 0.93 0.62 0.79 
2-sided p value 0.58 0.32 0.53 0.35 0.59 0.87 0.34 0.49 0.70 0.43 0.36 0.54 0.43 
1-sided p value 0.29 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.17 0.24 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.27 0.22 
F test of equal 
sample variances 
0.84 1.45 1.05 0.82 1.03 1.05 0.95 1.11 1.21 0.88 1.17 1.34 1.15 
p value 0.73 0.47 0.92 0.70 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.78 
Sign Test 2-
sided >, < HM 0 
11,4 12,3 11,6 11,3 9,1 6,2 9,6 6,3 3,2 11,6 11,6 11,6 12,5 
p value 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.61 0.51 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 
Sign Test 1-
sided >HM 0 
11 12 11 11 9 6 9 6 3 11 11 11 12 




88 94 106 82 45 25 87 34 11 108 108 108 109 
p value 2 sided 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.38 0.14 0.20 0.44 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
p value 1 sided 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Chi-Square 
Normality Test 
7.47 3.57 15.09 2.63 7.20 10.32 4.37 5.48 13.34 6.49 7.74 18.16 14.80 
p value 0.06 0.31 0.00 0.45 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 
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9.7875 20.44 26.58 40.95 0.00 0.00 22.40 0.00 0.00 53.65 69.49 40.75 26.94 
mean 
differences 
19.57 40.51 23.73 32.81 20.16 6.19 34.56 26.44 14.7 28.38 35.2 24.54 29.97 
Tests 
T-test 0.56 1.00 0.64 0.94 0.55 0.17 0.96 0.71 0.38 0.80 0.93 0.62 0.79 
2-sided p value 0.58 0.32 0.53 0.35 0.59 0.87 0.34 0.49 0.70 0.43 0.36 0.54 0.43 
1-sided p value 0.29 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.17 0.24 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.27 0.22 
F test of equal 
sample 
variances 
0.84 1.45 1.05 0.82 1.03 1.05 0.95 1.11 1.21 0.88 1.17 1.34 1.15 
p value 0.73 0.47 0.92 0.70 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.78 
Sign Test 2-
sided >,< HM 
0 
11,4 12,3 11,6 11,3 9,1 6,2 9,6 6,3 3,2 11,6 11,6 11,6 12,5 
p value 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.61 0.51 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 
Sign Test 1-
sided >HM 0 
11.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 9.00 6.00 9.00 6.00 3.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 




87.00 94.00 106.00 82.00 45.00 10.00 86.00 34.00 10.00 106.00 107.00 111.00 108.00 
p value 2 sided 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.63 0.15 0.20 0.63 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.14 
p value 1 sided 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.23 0.08 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.07 
Chi-Square 
Normality Test 
10.55 5.41 14.99 2.55 6.62 8.74 6.30 5.96 11.81 11.81 11.68 15.60 14.06 
p value 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.47 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Chapter VI: Summary and Conclusion 
Review of the Research Objectives 
Thus, although at first blush our coefficient of variation results would suggest that most 
pre-harvest marketing strategies outperform the harvest-time cash sale benchmark, our 
parametric tests show that there is no statistical difference between pre-harvest and harvest-time 
strategies either in terms of returns or risk levels. With regard to pre-harvest strategies not 
enhancing returns above harvest returns, this result provides strong supporting evidence that 
futures markets and related forward markets are efficient at pricing corn and that no economic 
advantage is gained from contracting in the pre-harvest window. This result would put us firmly 
in the Zulauf and Irwin (1998) camp rather than the Wisner Blue and Baldwin (1998) camp. The 
finding that pre-harvest strategies fail reduce risk in comparison to selling at harvest, on a year to 
year basis, is not that surprising (McKenzie, 2012). Although, it is important to note that this 
result says nothing about the risk management benefits of futures hedging or forward contracting 
intra crop year price risk.  
However, if we consider non-normality of price and profit distributions, and place greater 
credence on our nonparametric results, a different picture emerges. Our non-parametric tests and 
strategy comparisons across multiple facets and methods have yielded results that conclude that 
using pre-harvest contracts indeed give significantly different returns than by using the 
benchmark harvest-time October cash market. We found significant violations of the normality 
assumption with respect to profit distributions associated with our pre-harvest marketing 
strategies, and nonparametric tests – unlike parametric t-and F-tests – do not assume a normal 
distribution.  
If we take our nonparametric results coupled with our coefficient of variation comparison 
results there appears to be some support for several of the pre-harvest strategies. Setting a futures 
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hedge that covers 100% of cost of production at the first opportunity in the pre-harvest marketing 
window seems to have some merit over and above simply selling in the harvest-time cash 
market.  
However, we acknowledge that overall our results are providing somewhat mixed 
conclusions and the question of whether it is possible to enhance farm returns by marketing the 
pre-harvest window over simply selling in the harvest-time cash market is still an unresolved 
open question. To provide any definitive conclusions on the issue would require further research 
that replicates our modeling framework with larger data sets. More states and additional 
commodities could be analyzed over a longer sample time period. Also, perhaps international 
comparisons of returns can be attempted as well.  
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Chapter VII: Research Implications, Limitations and Further Studies 
In conclusion, this paper presents research that addresses an important topic in economic 
research (Blue, Wisner, Baldwin, 2004; Kenyon, 1997). In anticipation, we hope that a wide 
range of market participants and researchers can utilize our findings for their own benefit and the 
contribution towards improved future research.  Additionally, incorporating the findings into 
business practices, for producers and other marketers, should lend a hand in guiding them to a 
more informed decision.  
Perhaps further studies along the lines of Richard Thaler’s behavioral research can help 
shed further light on the rationality of market agents participating in commodity futures markets 
and the implications for market efficiency. In addition, further research that can test whether 
futures markets do a good job of accounting for seasonality in cash prices might lead to more 
robust results. Also, given current grain firm preferences for promoting average pricing 
contracts, more research that investigates these contracts risk-return profiles would be beneficial. 
Moreover, the incorporation of multiperiod contracts over two or more months should be 
considered. Under this research area, testing for higher returns during a specified time period can 
help determine how long an averaging contract should be undertaken. 
Some limitations of this thesis include ignoring transaction costs such as brokerage fees. 
Future research that incorporates this information might give a more realistic analysis of price 
and profit comparison across marketing strategies. For example, futures-based strategies contain 
brokerage fee costs such that the profit results presented here are biased upwards for futures 
strategies. While forward contract-based strategies do not. However, forward contracts prices 
may themselves contain embedded transaction costs in the form of risk-premiums implicitly 
charged by grain firms to farmers. Also, our research does not fully consider how yield risk 
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might impact marketing strategies. For example, in years when there is a crop-shortfall, farmers 
may not produce enough crop to deliver on forward contracts, and in such cases would face a 
non-deliver fee imposed by grain firms. We also do not account for government risk 
management support programs and policies that provide price and income support such as Price 
Loss Coverage (PLC), Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC), crop yield insurance or crop revenue 
insurance. Research is necessary to investigate how these government programs complement or 
substitute market-based risk management tools. From the point of view of farmers, a natural 
question to ask is: “how does participation in these various programs impact returns generated 
from marketing strategies such as hedging with futures and options and forward contracting with 
elevators?”  The optimal and most appropriate portfolio of market based, and government 
supported risk management tools is likely dependent upon commodity, current market 
environment, and regional location, and is a potentially fruitful and practically useful area of 
research.  
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